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11. Introduction
The literature on stock market design has recently devoted attention to mechanisms allowing traders
to exchange portfolios of assets. The idea behind these contributions is that the impossibility of
operating in more than one market at the same time, a feature that characterizes virtually all of the
existing stock markets, may either affect traders’ capability to rebalance their portfolios (Bossaerts,
Fine, and Ledyard, 2002) or seriously hamper their ability to exploit trade relevant information, and
trigger program trades that cause price oscillations (Amihud and Mendelson 1991a; Amihud and
Mendelson 1991b). A mechanism allowing the trade of asset portfolios would thus mitigate price
volatility and permit better portfolio re-balancing.
From the perspective of market design it is then important to understand how to concretely
implement such a trading system. Consider, for instance, a trader submitting an order to buy a given
vector of assets. She may want to condition her demand not only on the price of the asset she is
trading, but also to take advantage of cross-conditioning possibilities. In particular, she may want
to condition her decision to buy say a hundred shares of company A both on the price of company
A and on that of company B, to the extent that information ﬂows about the two companies are
somewhat related. This type of cross-conditioning has been advocated by many authors on grounds
of improved efﬁciency and reduced volatility (Beja and Hakansson, 1979; Amihud and Mendelson,
1991b; Economides and Schwartz, 1995). Surprisingly, little theoretical analysis has assessed the
desirability of its introduction.
Aside from theoretical considerations, this analysis is prompted by the deep changes in trading
procedures spurred by recent advances in information technology. ITG, the technology company
running the POSIT network, has recently started allowing its clients the submission of multi-price
2contingent orders. 1 Optimark, a trading system directed to institutional traders, allowed the spec-
iﬁcation of different parameters upon which to condition trade execution. 2 Archipelago, an open
limit order book system, allows participants to submit non standard types of orders. 3
Motivated by these considerations, I analyze the properties of two call-auction trading mecha-
nisms in which a vector of (two) risky assets is traded among a continuum of risk-averse informed
speculators and liquidity traders, with the intermediation of a competitive, risk-neutral market-
making sector. Informed traders receive a vector of private (noisy) signals about the vector of
liquidation values and, in the unrestricted mechanism, submit multi-price contingent orders; in the
restricted mechanism they submit standard (single-price contingent) limit orders. Market makers in
the unrestricted mechanism compete for each asset order ﬂow, whereas in the restricted mechanism
their competition is restricted to the order ﬂow of the asset they are assigned to. In both cases,
equilibrium prices are set equal to the expected value of the risky asset conditional on all public
information. Liquidity traders are modeled as having a vector of random demands. All random
variables are normally distributed and informed traders display a constant absolute risk-aversion
utility function. Equilibrium behavior is analyzed and implications for price informativeness and
traders’ welfare are addressed.
Contrary to common intuition, this analysis challenges the view that a multi-price contingent
1The electronic equity-matching system ITG started operating 14 years ago. Its trading platform QuantEX permits an
order submission strategy (“Pairs”) that automatically executes orders “when the spread differential between two stocks
reaches a speciﬁed level.” QuantEX, Electronic Trading Made Intelligent, available at http://www.itginc.com. I
thank Ekkehart Boehmer for pointing out this evidence to me.
2Besides submitting traditional limit and market orders, traders could condition their demand on a number of contin-
gencies. For instance, a trader could specify her willingness to pay more for a larger order size in a conﬁdential way, so
that the actual transaction price would not be affected. See Clemons and Weber (1998).
3For instance, traders can post “discretionary orders,” where they specify both a limit price and the price difference
they are willing to accept to get the order executed (for instance, a trader may want to buy 1000 shares at $10 but may be
willing to pay $101/4 at most. The order is posted at $10 and if a sell at $101/4 enters the book, it is executed). Also, they
can post tracking orders that are automatically adjusted to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) changes. See Wall
Street Letter, December 4, 2000. For a survey of recent trading platforms’ innovations see the Economist, May, 18th
2000.
3system should always render the market more efﬁcient. Amihud and Mendelson (1991b, p. 127)
arguethat“amechanismwhichenablessimultaneousconditioning ofordersfordifferentassets(...)
would increase the information available to traders, improve value discovery and reduce volatility.”
This assertion points at the positive effect that observing multiple sources of correlated information
has. By contrast, my paper unveils the dark side of a multi-price contingent system, by analyzing
its feedback effect on traders’ speculative aggressiveness.
A fundamental insight of a multi-asset market is that a trader’s use of multi-dimensional private
information depends on the type of order she submits, and on the amount of information market
makers observe (which, as a consequence, is reﬂected by equilibrium prices). In the unrestricted
system, market makers set prices conditionally on the vector of all order ﬂows; thus, all the cross-
order ﬂow information about fundamentals is already reﬂected into prices, and traders do not ﬁnd
such information useful to improve their position vis-` a-vis market makers. However, market makers
cannot observe the signals informed traders receive. Therefore, insofar as private signal error terms
are correlated, traders use multi-signal conditioning to disentangle error terms from fundamentals in
their private signals. Conversely, in the restricted system, market makers set prices conditionally on
the observation of the asset order ﬂow they are assigned to. Hence, equilibrium prices only partially
reﬂect cross-order ﬂow information about fundamentals. This, in turn, renders multiple private
signals useful to informed traders beyond the correlated information about error terms they contain.
The upshot is that whenever private signal error terms are independent, traders speculate more
aggressively on their private information in the restricted system than in the unrestricted system.
This implies that, when the information structure is homoscedastic, if order ﬂows are correlated only
through fundamentals, the restricted system delivers more informative prices than the unrestricted
system.
4The central idea behind the efﬁciency result is that differently from a single-asset framework,
in a multi-asset setup price informativeness depends on two factors: the correlation between each
order ﬂow and the asset payoff and the correlation across order ﬂows. Indeed, the more correlated
with the fundamentals the order ﬂows are, the more fundamental information can be extracted by
observing them; also, the more correlated order ﬂows are among themselves, the easier it is to
disentangle noise from information within each order ﬂow. Due to collinearity effects, the interplay
between these two factors may impair price informativeness in both trading systems. However,
this problem is neutralized in the restricted system as the stronger aggressiveness traders exhibit
magniﬁes the effect of the second factor, boosting price informativeness. This, on the other hand,
comes at the cost of making the price impact of trades harsher and, thus, noise traders’ expected
losses higher.
There is by now a vast literature studying the effects of different trading mechanisms on agents’
behavior and market patterns. However, most of it has concentrated on the analysis of single (risky)
asset markets. Madhavan (1992) compares the properties of quote driven systems with those of
order driven systems. Biais (1993) contrasts centralized and fragmented markets. Pagano and R¨ oell
(1996) assess the effects of market transparency on uninformed traders’ losses. Grossman (1992),
in a paper which is closely related to the present one, justiﬁes the coexistence of upstairs and down-
stairs markets. He argues that, contrary to what economic theory usually assumes, technical lim-
itations prevent investors from expressing their demands as a function of a price vector, and from
continuously updating them as new information arrives. This precludes investors’ preferences from
being accurately represented on organized markets, and gives upstairs dealers, acting as reposito-
ries of information about unexpressed demands, a transaction cost advantage vis-` a-vis downstairs
dealers. In view of this paper’s results, and insofar as a major function stock markets perform is to
5signal ﬁrms’ true assets’ payoffs, overcoming technological limitations may not always be a good
idea, as it can impair price efﬁciency. 4
Little is known about the properties of markets where traders’ private information is multi-
dimensional. A notable exception is the paper by Manzano (1997) where the author compares
multi-price and single-price contingent systems in a model with strategic traders. Also related
are the analyses of Wohl and Kandel (1997) and Brown and Holden (2002). These papers study
a trading mechanism where traders condition their demand for a given asset on a market index.
Hence, their focus is rather on the advantages of avoiding mispricing risk. 5 However, none of the
above papers assesses the effect that observing multiple sources of endogenous public information
(i.e. equilibrium prices) has on the use that traders make of multidimensional private information,
and on price efﬁciency.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I compare a one-asset market where
traders submit limit orders to one where they submit market orders. This provides a useful bench-
mark on which to build the comparison of market mechanisms in the multi-asset setup. In the third
section, I characterize the unique linear equilibria of the two mechanisms. In the fourth section,
I compare their properties. In the ﬁfth section I consider two extensions of the multi-asset model,
generalizing the structure of private information, and introducing an intermediate mechanism where
traders’ordersarerestrictedwhilemarket-makersareabletoobservemultipleorderﬂows. Thesixth
section concludes the paper. Most of the proofs are relegated to the ﬁnal appendices.
4See Fishman and Hagerty (1992) for a discussion of the importance of stock price efﬁciency for production decisions
within and outside the ﬁrm.
5Mispricing risk is the risk that a limit order is executed at a mispriced limit price (as is the case, e.g. when some
relevant information is revealed to the market and the limit price is not updated to take it into account).
62. The benchmark: limit orders vs. market orders
In this section I compare the properties of two markets where all the informed traders either submit
limit orders or submit market orders. As will become clear later, insofar as traders in the restricted
system fail to condition their demand on all the sources of information related to the fundamentals
(as they do when submitting a market order), this analysis provides a useful benchmark on which to
build the comparison of market mechanisms in the multi-asset setup. 6
In both markets a single risky asset with liquidation value v ∼ N(¯ v,τ−1
v ) and a riskless asset
with unitary return, are traded among risk averse informed speculators and noise traders with the in-
termediation of a competitive, risk neutral market making sector. There is a continuum of informed
traders in the interval [0,1]. Each informed trader k receives a private signal sk = v + ²k about
the unknown v, where ²k ∼ N(0,τ−1
² ), and ²k,²h are independent for k 6= h. Assume that her
preferences are represented by a CARA utility U(πk) = −exp{−πk/γ} where γ > 0 denotes the
coefﬁcient of constant absolute risk tolerance and πk = xk(v − p) indicates the proﬁt of buying
xk units of the asset at price p. Normalize the informed traders’ initial wealth to zero and let noise
traders submit a random demand u ∼ N(0,τ−1
u ). Finally, assume that the random variables v,u,²k
are independent ∀k and that, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 skdk equals almost surely v (i.e. errors
cancel out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 ²kdk = 0).
The “limit order” market
Suppose that all informed traders submit limit orders. Therefore, every trader k submits a schedule
XLk(sk,p) indicating her desired position in the risky asset contingent on her private signal and on
6Thus, this analysis does not provide a theory of order ﬂow composition as all informed traders are assumed to make
the same choice as to the type of order they submit in a market populated by risk neutral market makers and liquidity
traders. For a theory of order ﬂow composition see Foucault (1999).
7the price. I restrict my attention to linear equilibria where XLk(sk,p) = aLsk + bLp. Competitive,
risk neutral market makers set a semi-strong efﬁcient equilibrium price conditional on the observa-
tion of the order ﬂow L(p) =
R 1
0 XLk(sk,p)dk + u = aLv + u + bLp. Let zL = aLv + u denote
the informational content of the order ﬂow. Then, p = E[v|zL] and the following result applies
Proposition 1 (Vives (1995b)) In the limit order market there is a unique linear equilibrium. It is
symmetric and given by XLk(sk,p) = aL(sk −p) and p = λLzL +(1−λLaL)¯ v, where aL = γτ²,
λL = aLτu/τL and τL = (Var[v|zL])−1 = τv + a2
Lτu.
Intuitively, informed speculators’ trading aggressiveness in the limit order market aL increases
in the precision of their private signal and in the risk tolerance coefﬁcient. Market makers’ reaction
tothepresenceofinformedspeculatorsλL = aLτu/τL iscapturedbytheOLSregressioncoefﬁcient
of the unknown payoff value on the order ﬂow. As common in this literature λL measures the
reciprocal of market depth (see e.g. Kyle, 1985 and Vives 1995b, 1995a). The informativeness
of the equilibrium price is measured by the reciprocal of the payoff conditional variance given the
order ﬂow: (Var[v|zL])−1 = τL. The higher τL, the smaller the uncertainty on the true payoff value
once the order-ﬂow has been observed.
The “market order” market
Suppose instead all informed traders submit market orders. Thus, assume each trader k submits
a schedule XMk(sk) indicating her desired position contingent on the private signal she receives,
and restrict attention to linear equilibria where XMk(sk) = aMsk + bM. Competitive, risk neutral
market makers set a semi-strong efﬁcient equilibrium price conditional on the observation of the
8order ﬂow L =
R 1
0 XMk(sk)dk+u = aMv+u+bM. 7 Let zM = aMv+u denote the informational
content of the order ﬂow. Then, p = E[v|zM] and the following result applies
Proposition 2 (Vives (1995a)) In the market order market there is a unique linear equilibrium. It
is symmetric and given by XMk(sk) = aM(sk − ¯ v) and p = λMzM + (1 − λMaM)¯ v, where
aM = γ(τ−1
² + Var[p])−1 is the unique positive root of the cubic equation F(aM) = ((aM/γτ²) −
1)τv + (λM/γ)a2
M = 0, with λM = aMτu/τM and τM = (Var[v|zM])−1 = τv + a2
Mτu.
Informed speculators’ trading aggressiveness in the market order market aM is inversely related
to the ex-ante volatility of the price Var[p]. Indeed, while traders condition on private information,
they do not anticipate the equilibrium price. Thus, the larger the equilibrium price variance, the
higher the execution risk, i.e. the risk of having their order executed at a price different from the
one prevailing when they submitted it, and the smaller aM.
Comparing limit orders with market orders
Given the previous results, we can now compare traders’ behavior, market performance and traders’
welfare in the two markets. Indicate with Var[p;aL] and Var[p;aM] respectively the ex-ante price
volatility in the limit order market and in the market order market.
Proposition 3
1. Informed traders in the market order market trade less aggressively than in the limit order
market: aM < aL; as a result prices in the market order market are less informative and
ex-ante less volatile than in the limit order market: τM < τL and Var[p;aM] < Var[p;aL].
7An equivalent interpretation of this market is one where prices are set through a market clearing process, the com-
petitive market making sector submits limit orders while informed and noise traders submit market orders to a centralized
auctioneer (see Vives, 1995a).
92. The marketorder marketis deeper than the limitorder marketif and only ifaM/aL < τM/τL.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of aM and aL, since aM ≡ γ(τ−1
² +





L = Var[p;aL]. Part 2 follows from the deﬁnition of λM and λL. It is
immediate to see that there are values of the parameters for which λM < λL as rearranging this
inequality leads to (aM − aL)(τv − aMaLτu) < 0. As aM < aL, for this condition to hold it must
be that τv > aMaLτu. Suppose this is never possible, i.e. τv/aLτu ≤ aM, then as aM < aL, this
implies τv/τu < a2
L which is clearly not always true. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the above results is straightforward: risk averse informed speculators in the
market order market suffer from execution risk. As a consequence, they scale back their aggressive-
ness compared with speculators in the limit order market. Therefore, they embed less information
in the order ﬂow, lowering the market order market price informativeness. 8 Indicating with ρv,zM
the correlation coefﬁcient between the informational content of the order ﬂow and the asset payoff






Hence, in a semi-strong efﬁcient market, ex-ante price volatility reﬂects the arrival of information
(analogously in the limit order market Var[p;aL] = τ−1
v ρ2
v,zL). The stronger is the correlation
between the informational content of the order ﬂow and the fundamentals (i.e. the more informative
is the price about the liquidation value), the higher is the ex-ante volatility of the price.
8This result thus contrasts with Rochet and Vila (1994), who in their analysis of Kyle (1985) show that price infor-
mativeness does not depend on the type of order the insider submits. The reason is that in their model strategic behavior
leads the limit order insider to scale down her aggressiveness, equalizing the amount of information ﬂowing to the market
to that of the market order model. In the present context, no strategic effects arise while risk aversion translates execution
risk into a trading aggressiveness reduction.
10Comparing depth across the two markets, two effects are at play: ﬁrst, as aM < aL, market
makers’ adverse selection problem is less severe in the market order market; second, sinceτM < τL,
market makers in the market order market are less able to disentangle noise from information. If
the positive effect coming from the reduction in traders’ aggressiveness is stronger than the negative
effect due to the reduction in transparency, the market order market is deeper.
Indicate with Var[v −p|sk;aM] (Var[v −p|p,sk;aL]) the variance of the returns conditional on
private information in the market (limit) order market and with Var[v − p|p;aM] (Var[v − p|p;aL])
the variance of the returns conditional on the order ﬂow in the market (limit) order market.
Proposition 4
1. An informed trader k prefers to trade in the limit order market rather than in the market order
market if and only if (Var[v −p|p;aL])−1/2Var[v −p|p,sk;aL]1/2 < (Var[v −p|p;aM])−1/2
Var[v − p|sk;aM]1/2.
2. Noise traders’ expected losses are larger in the limit order market if and only if aM/aL ≤
τM/τL.
Proof. Standard normal calculations give E[−exp{−γ−1xMk(v − p)}] = E[E[−exp {−γ−1xMk
(v−p)}|sk]]= E[−exp{−γ−1 (E[xMk(v−p)|sk]−(1/2γ)Var[xMk(v−p)|sk])}]= E[−exp{−(1/2)
Var[v −p|sk]−1E[v −p|sk]2}], and applying lemma B1, E[−exp{−γ−1xMk(v −p)}] = (Var[v −
p|p;aM])−1/2 Var[v−p|sk;aM]1/2. Similarly, E[−exp{−γ−1xLk(v−p)}] = −(τL/(τL+τ²))1/2
= (Var[v−p|p;aL])−1/2 Var[v−p|p,sk;aL]1/2. For part 2, E[u(v−p)] = −λMτ−1
u in the market
order market and E[u(v − p)] = −λLτ−1
u in the limit order market. The result follows. Q.E.D.
Thus, the ex-ante expected utility that an informed trader earns submitting a market (limit)
order, depends on the informational advantage she retains over the market makers. The smaller is
11the volatility of returns, given the trader information, vis-` a-vis the volatility of returns, given the
market maker information, the more precise is traders’ estimate of asset returns compared to market
makers’. For a given payoff volatility and noise traders’ demand dispersion, the condition in the
proposition is satisﬁed whenever the quality of private information is poor, and traders are very
risk averse (τv = τu = τ² = γ = .1). If this is the case, submitting a limit order (i.e. drawing
inferences from the price) improves the precision of a trader’s forecast without dissipating too much
information to the beneﬁt of market makers. As the quality of information improves and traders
become more risk tolerant (e.g. τv = τu = .1, τ² = 4, and γ = 1), the reverse occurs, as the higher
aggressiveness traders display submitting a limit order makes them loose most of their informational
advantage to market makers. In this situation, a trader rather submits a market order.
As noise traders’ expected losses are inversely proportional to market depth, whenever the mar-
ket order market is deeper than the limit order market, noise traders experience lower expected
losses in that market.
3. Multi-asset vs. single-asset trading mechanisms
In this section I extend the assumptions of the previous section to a two-asset setup. For the nota-
tion let us indicate with Πx the precision matrix of the two-dimensional random vector x; with τxi
the precision of the random variable xi and with ρx the correlation coefﬁcient of the random vector
(x1,x2). Supposethatinformedandnoisetradersexchangeavectoroftwo riskyassetswithrandom
liquidation value v = (v1,v2) ∼ N(¯ v,Π−1
v ) and a riskless one with unitary return with the inter-
mediation of a competitive, risk neutral market making sector. There is a continuum of informed
traders in the interval [0,1]. Each informed trader k receives a vector of private signals sk = v+²k
about the unknown v, where ²k = (²k1,²k2) ∼ N(0,Π−1
² ), and ²k and ²h are independent for
12k 6= h. Assume that her preferences are represented by a CARA utility U(πk) = −exp{−πk/γ}
where γ > 0 indicates the coefﬁcient of constant absolute risk tolerance and πk = x0
k(v − p) de-
notes the proﬁt of buying (xk1,xk2) units of each asset at price p. Normalize the informed traders’
initial wealth to zero and let noise traders submit a random demand u = (u1,u2) ∼ N(0,Π−1
u ).
Assume that the random vectors v,u,²k are independent ∀k and that given v, the vector of average
signals
R 1
0 skdk equals almost surely v. Finally, let each of Π−1
v ,Π−1
u , and Π−1
² be positive def-
inite and suppose that the distributional assumptions are common knowledge among the agents in
the economy.
With the above assumptions, I consider two market mechanisms:
1. the unrestricted mechanism where (a) speculators condition their demand for each asset j on
the vector of private signals sk and on the price of assets j = 1,2, and (b) market makers set
the price of asset j conditionally on the observation of the order ﬂow of both assets j = 1,2;
2. the restricted mechanism where (a) speculators condition their demand for an asset j on the
vector of private signals sk and on the price of asset j only and (b) market makers set the price
of asset j conditionally on the observation of the order ﬂowj. In this case, interpreting market
makers as uninformed speculators, the model captures the features of the opening auction in
those markets where traders are allowed to condition their demand for an asset only on its
own price.
The unrestricted system
The unrestricted system is a version of the multi-asset model of Admati (1985) with the addition of
a risk-neutral, competitive, market-making sector as in Vives (1995b). 9
9For noisy rational expectations equilibrium models with a single risky asset see Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Ver-
recchia (1981) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
13Suppose informed traders submit multi-price contingent orders. Thus, each trader k submits a
vector of demand schedules Xk(sk,p), indicating the position desired in each asset j at every price
vector p, contingent on the available private information. I restrict my attention to linear equilibria.
In equilibrium, then, prices will be normally distributed.
Market makers observe the vector of aggregate order ﬂowsL(p) =
R 1
0 Xk(sk,p)dk+u. There-
fore, in pricing asset j each market maker uses both the information contained in order ﬂow j
and that contained in order ﬂow i 6= j. Owing to the assumed ex-ante symmetric information
structure, the vector of demand functions and the equilibria will be symmetric. Suppose then that
Xk(sk,p) = Ask + φ(p), where A, and φ(·) are, respectively, the matrix of trading intensities
and a linear function of current prices. The aggregate order ﬂow is then given by L(p) = z +φ(p),
where z = Av + u, denotes the vector of order ﬂows’ informational contents. Owing to compe-
tition for each order ﬂow and risk neutrality, market makers set a semi-strong efﬁcient price vector
p = E[v|z] = Π−1 (Πv¯ v + A0Πuz), where Π = Πv + A0ΠuA, and the following result
holds:
Proposition 5 In the unrestricted system there exists a unique equilibrium in linear strategies. It is
symmetric and given by
Xk(sk,p) = A(sk − p),
and p = Λz + (I − ΛA) ¯ v, where A = γΠ² and Λ = Π−1A0Πu.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 The matrix Λ maps order ﬂows into prices. For the equilibrium to be well-deﬁned, Λ
must be invertible and, given the model’s assumptions, this is always the case. Notice also that,
14owing to multicollinearity effects, the diagonal elements of this matrix can be negative (see Admati,
1985).
The next corollary characterizes how speculators use public and private information in equilib-
rium.
Corollary 1 In the unrestricted system, an informed speculator’s demand for each asset j = 1,2,
depends on the whole private signal vector sk and on the whole price vector p if and only if ρ² 6= 0.
Proof. Follows from the fact that A = γΠ².
Corollary 1 highlights a fundamental property of the unrestricted system: informed traders’
multi-price (and signal) conditioning is optimal if and only if the private signals’ conditional preci-
sion matrix is not diagonal. The intuition is as follows. As market makers observe both order ﬂows,
equilibrium prices reﬂect all cross-order ﬂow information about the fundamentals. Hence, informed
traders do not ﬁnd such information useful to improve their position vis-` a-vis market makers. How-
ever, market makers cannot observe the signals informed traders receive. Therefore, insofar as error
terms are correlated, traders use multi-price (and multi-signal) conditioning to disentangle error
terms from fundamentals within their private signals.
Remark 2 Writing in scalar form a trader’s strategy one can see that the trading intensity in an asset
j is the composition of two effects: a direct one stemming from the informational advantage the
speculator has over the rest of the market in asset j, and an indirect one coming from the informa-
tional advantage she has on the other asset, to the extent that the received signals are correlated. To
see this, indicate with τ²j, j = 1,2 the (conditional) signal precision in asset j. Then, the strategy










(ski − pi). (3.2)
Assume that ρ² > 0 and that speculator k receives two signals skj, ski such that skj > pj and
ski > pi. This can happen for two reasons: either both assets are worth more than what the market
thinks (i.e. asset prices are biased downwards e.g. by noise traders’ selling pressure); or both signals
are biased upwards. A downward bias in equilibrium prices is good news since it gives the trader the
possibility of taking advantage of the market’s forecast error. Her demand in each asset is larger, the
more precise are the signals she has received. However, the existence of positive correlation across
signal-error terms strengthens the hypothesis of a contemporaneous, upward bias in the speculator’s
signals. Given this, the speculator reinforces her belief that the good news she received about both
assets is due to the effect of error terms and reduces her demand in both asset j and asset i. 10
When no correlation across error terms exists (ρ² = 0), speculators have no way to reduce the
bias in their strategies by pooling together private signals and ﬁnd it optimal to submit single-signal
and single-price contingent orders.
Notice, however, that even if ρ² = 0, market makers still use the information contained in all the
order ﬂows when pricing an asset. Indeed, their demand can be written as XMM(p) = (Λ−1 −
A)(¯ v − p), and it is easy to see that the diagonality of Π² does not imply the diagonality of
(Λ−1 − A). 11
10One can interpret the second term in the speculator’s strategy (3.2) as a “correction” of the position the trader takes
by only observing skj, due to the observation of ski. This correction is stronger (weaker) the higher (lower) is the
correlation across error terms. Indeed, for a bivariate normal distribution, the value of Fρ²(²k1,²k2) is increasing in ρ²
for all ρ² ∈ [−1,1] and all ﬁxed (²k1,²k2): a higher correlation across error terms increases the probability that a joint
bias in private signals occurs (see e.g. Tong, 1990).
11Notice that differently from Admati (1985) in this market, multicollinearity problems may determine the existence
of a “Giffen” asset in the market makers’ demand, but not in the demand of an informed trader (see Cespa, 2003).
16The restricted system
In the restricted system, a speculator k can condition her demand for an asset j on the whole vec-
tor of private signals sk and on the price of asset j only. Assume she submits a demand schedule
XRkj(sk,pRj), indicating the desired position in asset j at every price pRj, contingent on the avail-
able information. As done for the unrestricted system, I restrict my attention to linear equilibria.
Therefore, equilibrium prices will be normally distributed. 12
The market makers of asset j observe the asset order ﬂow (that potentially carries informa-
tion about both assets) but do not observe the order ﬂow of the other asset. Formally, they thus
observe LRj(pRj) =
R 1
0 XRkj(sk,pRj)dk + uj. As the information structure is assumed to be
ex-ante symmetric, demand functions and equilibria will again be symmetric. Suppose then that
XRkj(sk,pRj) = j0ARsk + φRj(pRj), where j is a column vector containing a 1 in the j-th
position and a zero elsewhere, AR is the matrix of trading intensities in the restricted system,
and φRj(·) is a linear function of the j-th price. The aggregate order ﬂow of asset j is then
LRj(pRj) = zRj + φRj(pRj), where zRj = j0(ARv + u), denotes the order ﬂow’s informa-
tional content. Given competition and market makers’ risk neutrality, the equilibrium price of asset
j is given by pRj = ¯ vj +λRjj0(AR(v−¯ v)+u), where λRj = (Var[zRj])−1Cov[vj,zRj], indicates
the OLS regression coefﬁcient of vj on zRj (i.e. the usual measure of market depth). Consequently,
we have the following
Lemma 1 In every linear equilibrium of the restricted system, the vector of equilibrium prices is
given by
pR = ΛRzR + (I − ΛRAR) ¯ v, (3.3)
12To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to characterize the equilibrium in a multi-asset framework
where competitive, risk averse traders receive different signals and bear restrictions in the number of asset prices they can
condition upon.
17where ΛR = diag(λR1,λR2) and zR = ARv +u are respectively the matrix of market depths and
the vector of order ﬂows’ informational contents in the restricted model.
In the restricted system market makers can exploit cross-asset information in estimating an
asset value if and only if speculators use both their signals when trading the asset. Conversely, in
the unrestricted system even if A is diagonal, the price of an asset j depends on the order ﬂow of
the other asset (to the extent that either Πv or Πu are not diagonal).
The following lemma characterizes informed speculators’ equilibrium demand parameters.
Lemma 2 In every linear equilibrium of the restricted system, an informed speculator k’s demand
for asset j = 1,2 is given by XRkj(sk,pRj) = j0AR(sk − ¯ v) + bRj(¯ vj − pRj), where
j0AR = γ (Var[vj|sk,pRj])
−1 c2j, and bRj = γ (Var[vj|sk,pRj])
−1 (1 − c1j/λRj), (3.4)
and c1j, c2j, and Var[vj|sk,pRj] are deﬁned in Appendix A.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thenextpropositionprovesexistenceanduniquenessoftheequilibriumintherestrictedsystem,
and the following corollary characterizes the equilibrium parameters.
Proposition 6 In the restricted system there exists a unique equilibrium in linear strategies. The
equilibrium is symmetric and the price vector is given by (3.3), while the demand parameters are
implicitly deﬁned by (3.4).
Corollary 2 Let aRjj = (AR)jj and aRji = (AR)ji. In the unique linear equilibrium of the
restricted system:





2. (a) aRjj = γτ²j(1 − γ−1aRjiCov[²1,²2]) > 0 and (b) λRj > 0;





τvj/τvi, aRjj = γτ²j, aRji = 0, and bRj = −aRjj.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The interpretation of these results is as follows. For part 1, suppose an informed speculator
trading asset 1 receives two “high” signals sk1, sk2. This may be the effect of either fundamental
information, or of errors in the signals. The ﬁrst possibility is more likely the stronger is the corre-
lation of asset payoffs compared to error terms’ correlation and the higher is the relative dispersion
of asset payoffs compared to error terms’ relative dispersion. In this case, indeed, the effect of fun-
damental information dominates the effect of errors in the signal vector. For part 2 (a) suppose that
aR12 > 0. This means that an informed trader increases her speculative position in asset 1 upon
receiving “good news” about asset 2. However, if ρ² > 0, good news about asset 1 may come from
the joint effect of signal error terms. Therefore, the trader scales down the weight she puts on sk1,
the higher is the trading intensity she puts on sk2. For 2 (b), the impossibility of observing more
than one order ﬂow when pricing an asset eliminates the multicollinearity effects that occur in the
unrestricted system. Therefore, the matrix ΛR is positive deﬁnite. 13 For part 3, the intuition is that
a given signal ski is useful in trading an asset j 6= i if it carries information either about vj or about
the error term ²kj. As the correlation across error terms vanishes, ski is still useful for the informa-
tion it contains about vj. Therefore, speculators use it in trading asset j. Notice that this result is
13This explanation is therefore different from the one in Caball´ e and Krishnan (1994), where the phenomenon is due to
the hypothesis of imperfect competition among insiders that prevents the existence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities.
19in stark contrast with corollary 1: market makers’ inability to observe all order ﬂows renders both
signals useful to informed traders beyond the correlated information about error terms they contain.





no way for a speculator to disentangle error terms from information by pooling the two signals she
receives. As a consequence aRji = 0.
Remark 3 As done for the unrestricted system, let us consider more closely a trader’s strategy in
the restricted system:
XRkj(sk,pRj) = aRjj(skj − ¯ vj) + aRji(ski − ¯ vi) + bRj(¯ vj − pRj).
Again, k’s trading intensity in asset j is the composition of 2 effects: a direct one stemming
from the informational advantage the speculator has over the rest of the market in asset j, and
an indirect one coming from the informational advantage she has on the other asset, to the extent





skj > ¯ vj, ski > ¯ vi. As the effect of fundamental information dominates the effect of errors in the
signal vector, the speculator reinforces her belief that the asset value is high and increases her long
position. If ¯ vj > pRj, such a long position is further increased because of the low price the market
gives to the asset. 14
14Numerical simulations show that bRj > 0.
204. Comparing the unrestricted with the restricted system
Trading aggressiveness and price informativeness
In section 2, I have related a trader’s aggressiveness to the type of order she submits in a single asset
market, and analyzed the implications of different order types for price informativeness. In this
section, I ﬁrst show that in a multi-asset world not only the type of order, but also the way prices
are formed inﬂuences a trader’s aggressiveness. I then analyze the relationship between trading
aggressiveness and price informativeness.
Proposition 7 Let ajj = (A)jj and aji = (A)ji. Then,
1. when ρv = 0 and ρ² 6= 0, ajj > aRjj, |aji| > |aRji|;
2. when ρ² = 0 and ρv 6= 0, ajj = aRjj, |aji| < |aRji|;
3. when ρ² = ρv = 0 and ρu 6= 0, ajj = aRjj = τ²j, |aji| = |aRji| = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 shows that the ranking of traders’ aggressiveness across the two systems depends
on correlation coefﬁcients. As shown in corollaries 1 and 2, informed speculators combine private
signals to disentangle error terms from fundamental information. When ρv = 0 and ρ² 6= 0, in the
unrestricted system this can be done comparing signals with prices whereas in the restricted system
traders compare signals with prior means. As prices are better estimators of the fundamentals,
traders in the unrestricted system are better able to assess the extent of their signal bias. As a
consequence, they speculate more aggressively on their private information. When ρ² = 0 and
ρv 6= 0, in the unrestricted system informed traders don’t use multidimensional private information
to improve their strategies, and submit single signal-contingent orders. Conversely, in the restricted
21system they use the cross asset information contained in their signals (and not already fully reﬂected
in the price). This, in turn, boosts their trading aggressiveness. Finally, when ρ² = ρv = 0 and
ρu 6= 0 in both systems there is no way for speculators to disentangle error terms from information,
and their trading aggressiveness coincide. 15
Price informativeness is measured by the reduction in the unconditional variance of an asset
j’s payoff due to the observation of the vector of order ﬂows. Thus, in the unrestricted system
Ipj = τ−1
vj − Var[vj|z], while in the restricted system IpRj = τ−1
vj − Var[vj|zR]. This deﬁnition is
natural in the unrestricted system as it corresponds to the ex-ante volatility of asset j’s price. In the
restricted system it captures the point of view of an econometrician interested in estimating the deep
parameters of the market, that regresses asset j’s fundamentals on the order ﬂows, and measures the
informativeness of these regressors using IpRj. Alternatively, it captures the perspective of a trader
who, before submitting an order observes the past asset price as well as the price formed in a related
market. I will thus say that the unrestricted system prices are more informative than those of the
restricted system if and only if Ipj ≥ IpRj, for j = 1,2. 16






















15 Part 2 of proposition 7, may seem to contrast with the intuition formed in section 2. As in the restricted system
strategies do not depend on all the information related to the fundamentals - as in the market order market - one may
think that a trader should also speculate less aggressively. However, in the restricted system market makers do not
observe both order ﬂows; thus, lack of cross-conditioning ability does not expose traders to price movements spurred by
events affecting other order-ﬂows.
16For an efﬁciency comparison in a one-asset, strategic set up where traders have information both on the fundamental
value and on the source of noise see Palomino (2001).
22It is useful to compare the above formulas with their analogues in a single asset framework (equa-
tion (2.1)). Differently from the one-asset setup – for a given payoff volatility – in a multi-asset
market price informativeness depends on two factors: the total correlation between order ﬂows and
the asset payoff – taking into account the potential “correction” for redundant information – and
the correlation across order-ﬂows. 17 The more correlated with the fundamentals the order ﬂows
are (i.e. the higher is the numerator in each one of (4.5)), the more fundamental information can be
extracted by observing them. The more correlated among themselves the order ﬂows are (i.e. the
lower is the denominator in each one of (4.5)), the easier it is to disentangle noise from information
within each order ﬂow. 18
From now on I restrict attention to the “homoscedastic case,” assuming that τvj = τv, τuj = τu,
and that τ²j = τ², for j = 1,2. Besides simplifying the analysis, this also allows us to concen-
trate on correlation effects, abstracting from the role that differences in signals’ precisions, payoffs
dispersions and noise trader demands’ volatilities play on the use of private information.
Proposition 8 In the homoscedastic case, when ρ² = ρu = 0, for ρv small, prices in the restricted
system are more informative than in the unrestricted system.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Numerical simulations support the above result also for larger values of |ρv|. In particular,
letting ρv ∈ {−.9,−.8,...,.8,.9}, ρu = ρ² = 0 and γ,τu,τv,τ² ∈ {.2,.4, .5,.6, .8,1,3,4}
17To understand the negative term in the numerator of (4.5), consider for instance the case in which ρvj,zRj > 0,
ρvj,zRi > 0, and ρzRj,zRi > 0. In this situation, observing a high value of zRj induces one to believe that vj is high.
This belief is further reinforced if zRi is also high. However, as ρzRj,zRi > 0, such inference could be upward biased
as part of the zRj and zRi realizations may be due to the positive correlation that links these two random variables. The
negative term in the numerator of (4.5) corrects for this kind of problems.
18For example, observing two “large” order ﬂows realizations, and knowing that order ﬂows are, say, positively cor-
related only through fundamentals, leads one to conclude that these signals are likely to be result of high fundamentals
rather than positive noise traders demands.
23price informativeness is always higher in the restricted system (see ﬁgures 1 and 2, panel (a) for an
example). 19
According to proposition 7, if order ﬂows are correlated only through payoffs, traders in the
restricted system speculate more aggressively than in the unrestricted system. As a result, the corre-
lation between each order ﬂow and the asset payoff and across order ﬂows in the restricted system
is larger than in the unrestricted system. This has two effects on price informativeness. First, owing
to the correction for redundant information, it may make the total correlation between order ﬂows
and the asset payoff in the restricted system lower than in the unrestricted system. Second, it unam-
biguously improves the ability to disentangle noise from information within each order ﬂow in the
restricted system. As the latter effect is always stronger than the former, prices end up being more
informative in the restricted system. 20
This ﬁnding is in stark contrast with the common wisdom that a major beneﬁt of a multi-price
contingent system is that of rendering the market more efﬁcient. Indeed, Amihud and Mendelson
(1991b, p. 127) argue that a “mechanism which enables simultaneous conditioning of orders for
different assets (...) would increase the information available to traders, improve value discovery
and reduce volatility.” This assertion points at the positive effect that observing multiple sources
of correlated information has. By contrast, proposition 8 unveils the dark side of a multi-price
contingent system, by uncovering its feedback effect on price informativeness.
The above result can also be interpreted as a multi-asset analogue of the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) paradox on the impossibility of informationally efﬁcient markets. Indeed, the more informa-
tion is revealed by prices (and the more prices traders observe), the lower is the weight traders put
19Simulations were run with the aid of Octave.
20Notice that the condition given in proposition 8 is sufﬁcient but it is by no means a necessary one. It is easy to show
that in the homoscedastic case when ρv = ρ² 6= 0 and ρu = 0, prices in the restricted system are more informative than
in the unrestricted system.
24on their signals; this, in turn, makes prices in the unrestricted system less informative than in the
restricted system. It is however worth stressing that in a in a multi-asset setup a stronger aggressive-
ness per-se does not grant a higher price informativeness; for as a result of a strong aggressiveness,
order ﬂows can be highly correlated among themselves but poorly correlated with the fundamen-
tals (examples can be constructed where for ρ² 6= 0 and ρv = ρu = 0 in the homoscedastic case,
prices in the restricted system are more informative than in the unrestricted system, although traders
speculate more aggressively in the unrestricted system).
How reasonable is the chosen parameterization and how robust are the results presented above?
First of all, it seems realistic to assume that ρ² = 0, as it is likely that each signal in the vec-
tor a trader receives contains information produced by a different analyst. More interesting is the
situation in which noise traders’ demands are correlated. In this case, the ﬁnal effect on price in-
formativeness is ambiguous. For values of |ρu| smaller than .002%, and for the same parameter
space described above, the restricted system prices are still more informative than those of the un-
restricted system. However, larger values of |ρu| reduce the strong correlation across order ﬂows in
the restricted system (i.e. increase the denominator of IpRj in (4.5)), dampening its positive effect
on price informativeness, and, for some parameter values, revert the informativeness ranking.
Please insert ﬁgure 1 here.
Informed expected utility and noise traders’ losses
In this section I study traders’ welfare in the two systems. As to noise traders, their expected losses
depend on the price impact of trades, i.e. the extent to which prices move as a result of market
25makers’ order ﬂow observation. For what concerns informed traders, the decision to trade in the
unrestricted instead of the restricted system depends on the informational advantage they are able
to retain vis-` a-vis market makers in each mechanism.
To ﬁx notation, indicate with πk = x0
k(v − p) and with πRk = x0
Rk(v − pR) respectively an
informed trader k’s proﬁt in the unrestricted and in the restricted system. Also let −E[u0(v−p)] =
tr(ΛΠ−1
u ) and −E[u0(v − pR)] = tr(ΛRΠ−1
u ) denote respectively noise traders’ expected losses
in the unrestricted and in the restricted system.
As for informed traders, in the unrestricted system a straightforward application of lemma B1
gives E[−exp{−γ−1πk}] = −|Π|1/2 |Π + Π²|−1/2, whereas for the restricted system see Ap-
pendix B.
Proposition 9 In the homoscedastic case, when ρ² = ρu = 0, for ρv small, noise traders’ expected
losses are always higher in the restricted system.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With the above parameter conﬁguration, speculators trade more aggressively in the restricted
system, embedding more information in the order ﬂows. This worsens market makers’ adverse
selection problem in the restricted system, making the price impact of trade stronger and noise
traders’ expected losses higher.
Numerical simulations support the result also for higher values of |ρv|. In particular, using the
same parameterization of section 4, noise traders’ expected losses are always higher in the restricted
system (see ﬁgures 1 and 2, panel (b) for an example). 21
21If noise traders’ demands are correlated the above ranking may be reverted. To see why, notice that in the ho-
moscedastic case −E[u
0(v − p)] = 2τ
−1
u (λ1 + ρuλ2), and −E[u
0(v − pR)] = 2τ
−1
u λR, where λ1 and λ2 indicate
respectively the main and off-diagonal terms of the matrix Λ. Thus, in the unrestricted system as the price of each asset
reacts to both order-ﬂows, noise traders’ losses also depend on the off-diagonal terms of the matrix Λ. Conversely, in the
26For what concerns informed speculators, as long as their risk aversion is strong and the quality
of private information is poor (e.g. γ and τ², smaller than 1) they are better off in the unrestricted
system but as τ² or γ increase, they are better off in the restricted system (see ﬁgures 1 and 2, panel
(c) for an example). The intuition is along the lines of what was said in section 2. Traders prefer
the unrestricted system as long as they speculate less aggressively, (either because their information
is poor, or because their risk aversion is high). In this situation they take advantage of multiple
sources of information (prices) without losing much of their advantage vis-` a-vis market makers.
However, as their information becomes more precise (or they are less averse to the risk of trading),
their aggressiveness increases and the possibility for market makers to observe both order-ﬂows in
the unrestricted system becomes a drawback. In this case, thus, they rather trade on the restricted
system where – although they impound more correlated information in each price – market makers
only observe the order ﬂow of the asset they price. 22
Please insert ﬁgure 2 here.
restricted system, noise traders’ losses in each asset only depend on the price impact of trades in the relative market. For
small values of |ρu| (e.g. |ρu| ≤ .0001), cross-order ﬂows effects are mild and noise traders are always better off in the
unrestricted system. As |ρu| increases, however, the reverse may happen.
22More precisely, the advantage of trading in the unrestricted system is stronger, the more concentrated is noise traders’
demand, and the better is the ex-ante information about fundamentals. In this case, indeed, for high values of γ and τ², the
stronger aggressiveness displayed in the use of multidimensional information in the restricted system counteracts market
makers’ possibility to observe multiple order ﬂows in the unrestricted system.
275. Discussion and extensions
An alternative information structure
In the analysis conducted so far, I have ruled out the possibility that traders’ private signals are
biased by the presence of a “common” error term. However, insofar as signals may incorporate an
industry bias, such a possibility becomes relevant.
Formally, in this case a trader k’s private signal (vector) is given by sk = v + η + ²k, where
η ∼ N(0,Π−1
η ), represents the common error term that I assume to be independent from both the
payoff (Cov[η,v] = 0), and the idiosyncratic component (Cov[η,²k] = 0, ∀k ∈ [0,1]). An imme-
diate consequence of this assumption is that in this market the vector of average private signals no
longer reveals the true asset payoffs. This increases traders’ uncertainty in both systems, potentially
affecting their trading aggressiveness and thus price efﬁciency. 23
To what extent do the results obtained in section 4 carry over to the present setup? While a
closed form solution ceases to be available for the unrestricted system, numerical methods can be
used to compute the linear equilibria of both systems in the homoscedastic case. The results broadly
conﬁrm most of the intuitions gained in the previous sections. In particular, it is still true that in the
presence of correlation only across payoffs traders use multidimensional private information in the
restricted system but refrain from doing so in the unrestricted system. This, in turn, increases the
correlation across order ﬂows in the restricted system, making its pricesmore informative than those
of the unrestricted system. Results on noise traders’ expected losses are, however, inconclusive: for
large values of γ,τu,τ², and τη, these are higher in the unrestricted system; the opposite occurs for
23In a one-asset, limit order setup where traders’ signals are biased by a common and an idiosyncratic error component,
it is easy to verify that the unique linear equilibrium trading aggressiveness is given by a = (τ² + τη + a
2τu)
−1γτ²τη,
where a is the unique positive root of the cubic F(a) = a
3τu + a(τ² + τη) − γτ²τη = 0, and τη is the precision
of the common error term. As one can verify a < γτ². Thus, the higher uncertainty makes traders scale back their
aggressiveness.
28smaller values of the above parameters. 24
An “Intermediate” system
The results obtained in the previous sections have shown that a mechanism disseminating a large
amount of (endogenous) public information may have a negative impact on price informativeness. If
this is the case, a system where market makers observe both order ﬂows, while informed speculators
bearsingle-pricerestrictions, shoulddeliverpricesthatarecontemporaneouslyless informativethan
those of the restricted system, and more informative than those of the unrestricted system. The
opening call auction of the NYSE provides an example of such a system. There, each specialist
handles more than one stock, and can thus make “cross” asset inference at the moment of setting the
opening price; speculators, however, condition their strategies only on the price of the stock they
want to trade. 25
Notice that differently from the restricted system, in this case market makers learn cross asset
information independently from informed traders’ equilibrium behavior. As a consequence, the
equilibrium price of each asset is informationally equivalent to the linear combination of both order
ﬂows’ informational content. In this framework, a closed form solution is unavailable. However,
restricting attention to the homoscedastic case, it can be shown that a linear rational expectations
equilibrium exists. 26
To compare price efﬁciencies, I run simulations on the three models, using the same parameter-
ization of section 4. The results broadly accord to intuition: for most parameter values, when only
24Computations are available from the author. Numerical simulations where run letting ρv ∈ {−.9,−.8,...,.8,.9},
ρu = ρ² = ρη = 0, and γ,τu,τv,τ²,τη ∈ {.2,.4, .5,.6, .8,1,3,4}. For this parameters’ space, increased payoff
uncertainty has a different impact on traders’ aggressiveness across the two systems: if ρ² = ρu = ρη = 0 and ρv 6= 0,
numerical simulations show that ajj > 0, aRjj > 0, and ajj > aRjj, while |aRji| > |aji| = 0.
25Lindsay and Schaede (1990, p. 12) report that in 1987 “(...) the average number was 3.7 stocks per specialist.”
26The proof is available from the author. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is an issue. Numerical simulations have been
carried out and for different initial conditions the solution of the ﬁxed point problem did not change.
29correlation across fundamentals affects order ﬂows, speculators in the restricted system trade more
aggressively than in the intermediate system; in turn speculators in the intermediate system trade
more aggressively than in the unrestricted system. This induces a price vector in the intermediate
system that on the one hand is less informative than in the restricted system and on the other hand
is more informative than in the unrestricted system (ﬁgure 3, panel (c)). 27
There are however exceptions: when (a) noise traders’ demand is very dispersed (τu ≤ .2),
and (b) correlation across payoffs is strong (|ρv| ≥ .8) the aggressiveness-informativeness ranking
between the restricted and the intermediate system is reversed. Owing to high noise traders’ demand
dispersion, risk-averse speculators in the restricted system suffer from a large conditional volatility
of the payoff and scale back their aggressiveness. Conversely, in the intermediate system, market
makers’ multiple order ﬂows observation dampens the price impact of trades reducing speculators’
payoff conditional volatility. As a result, speculators trade more aggressively and embed more
information in the order ﬂows rendering prices more informative (ﬁgure 3, panel (a)).
Results for noise traders’ expected losses are inconclusive: for some parameterizations noise
traders are better off in the intermediate system than in the unrestricted one (ﬁgure 3, panel (b))
while for other parameterizations the reverse occurs (ﬁgure 3, panel (d)). 28
Please insert ﬁgure 3 here.
27More precisely, the aggressiveness ranking makes the total correlation between order ﬂows and the asset payoff and
across order ﬂows in the restricted system larger than in the intermediate system. As a consequence, the restricted system
price vector turns out to be more informative than the intermediate system one. As for the intermediate–unrestricted
informativeness ranking, the pattern parallels what has been observed in section 4.
28To study price informativeness, simulations have been extended letting γ, τv,τu and τ² ∈ {.01, .1, .2, .4, .5,.6,
.8,1,3,4}. As far as noise traders’ expected losses, in some simulations they can even be higher in the intermediate
system than in the restricted one.
306. Conclusions
Advances in information technology are deeply modifying the way stock market procedures are
handled. ITG, a technology company, through its trading platform QuantEX permits a submis-
sion strategy (“Pairs”) that automatically executes orders “when the spread differential between
two stocks reaches a speciﬁed level.” The Optimark platform provides a system allowing traders
to specify different parameters upon which to condition execution and Bondconnect implements a
mechanism allowing the exchange of portfolios of assets. These examples testify the effort to im-
prove trade execution, allowing more ﬂexibility both in the determination of the number of assets
to exchange and in the amount of trade relevant information to exploit when submitting an order.
Motivated by this evidence, I have analyzed two trading systems where competitive speculators ex-
ploit multi-dimensional sources of private information, and contrasted their properties on the basis
of two different pricing schemes. In the unrestricted mechanism, traders submit multi-price con-
tingent demand functions and market makers set prices observing all order ﬂows; in the restricted
mechanism, speculators submit standard limit orders and market makers bear a single order ﬂow
restriction.
The results show that the way traders use private information crucially depends both on the type
of order they submit and on the speciﬁc price formation mechanism one considers. Indeed, to the
extent that private and public information are substitutable, a system allowing traders to observe
more public signals, under some conditions, reduces the weight they put on their private signals.
This, in turn, reduces the amount of information embedded in the order ﬂows and may ultimately
make a multi-price contingent mechanism less efﬁcient than a single price contingent one, in stark
contrast with the view that a mechanism of the ﬁrst type should render prices more informative. The
paper thus uncovers the existence of a possible trade-off between the quantity of multi-dimensional
31public information that traders can access, and its resulting quality.
Many issues are left for future research. In particular, a dynamic extension of the model pre-
sented here would allow one to study how information updating through the observation of past
prices inﬂuences traders’ behavior and market properties. 29 Also, introducing production in the
restricted model would allow to study the interactions among ﬁrms’ competition, traders’ behavior,
and stock price determination. This last issue seems particularly relevant given that there is virtually
no analysis of the links between ﬁrms’ conduct in the product market and investors’ reactions to the
resulting stock price effects. 30
29See He and Wang (1995), Vives (1995a;1995b), and Cespa (2002) for models of single-asset, dynamic trading in a
competitive stock market. Chan (1992) studies price determination in a multi-asset Kyle (1985) market where in each
period n, market makers observe the order ﬂow of the asset they price and the period n − 1 prices of all the other
assets. However, in his case informed speculators’ behavior is not modeled, thus the feedback effects of prices on private
information usage cannot be analyzed.
30Fishman and Hagerty (1989) and Dow and Rahi (2002) analyze how the information gathered in the market place
affects a ﬁrm’s investment decisions; Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988) investigate how product-market consid-
erations inﬂuence an informed ﬁrm’s decision to reveal information to the capital market; Poitevin (1989) shows how a
ﬁnancially-constrained entrant, by signaling information about its leverage to the capital market, spurs a “deep-pocket”
incumbent to engage in predatory practices.
32Appendix A
Proof of proposition 5. Notice that in every linear equilibrium, as p = E[v|z] = Π−1(Πv¯ v +
A0Πuz), where (Var[v|z])−1 = Π = Πv + A0ΠuA, the vector of equilibrium prices is ob-
servationally equivalent to z. Next, owing to CARA preferences, the trader’s demand vector is
given by Xk(sk,p) = (Var[v|sk,p])−1 (E[v|sk,p] − p). Assume that the matrix A is invertible,
then A−1z = (A0ΠuA)−1 (Πp − Πv¯ v)|v ∼ N(v,A−1Π−1






Thus, using the properties of the multivariate normal, (Var[v|sk,p])−1 = Πv + A0ΠuA + Π²
= Π + Π² and E[v|sk,p] = (Π + Π²)−1(ΠE[v|z] + Π²sk) (see for instance DeGroot, 1969).
Plugging these expressions into the trader’s strategy and simplifying Xk(sk,p) = γΠ²(sk − p).
Hence, A = γΠ² is a positive deﬁnite matrix. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2. In the restricted system a speculator k determines her position in each asset
separately and independently. Therefore, owing to CARA preferences, her demand for each asset
j is given by XRkj(pRj,sk) = γ(Var[vj|pRj,sk])−1 (E[vj|pRj,sk] −pRj), and because of the
assumed ex-ante symmetric information structure (whereby each informed trader receives a signal
of the same precision), demand functions and equilibria will be symmetric. Then, E[vj|pRj,sk] =
¯ vj +(c1j c0
2j) ((j0λ−1
j (p − ¯ v))0 (sk − ¯ v)0)0, where the scalar c1j and the vector c0
2j are deﬁned as
follows: (c1j c0




























and Cov[vj,{pRj,sk}] = ( (j0ARΠ−1
v j)0 (j0Π−1
v )0 )0.



















where D1 = j0(AR(Πv + Π²)−1A0
R + Π−1
u )j, and









Using the previous covariance matrix and since Var[vj|pRj,sk] = j0Π−1
v j− (Cov[vj,{pRj,sk}])0
(Var[pRj,sk])−1(Cov[vj,{pRj,sk}]), afterstandardnormalcalculationsIobtainc1j = (j0AR(Πv+
Π²)−1j)/D1, c2j = j0(I−ARc1j)(Πv+Π²)−1Π², and, Var[vj|pRj,sk] = j0(I−ARc1j)(Πv+
Π²)−1j. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 6. Equilibrium existence depends on the existence of a solution to the ﬁxed
point problem given by the ﬁrst of (3.4). To compute the equilibrium, notice that for j = 1,2, i 6= j,
this system can be rewritten as follows:


















where aRjj = (AR)jj, aRji = (AR)ji, hjj = ((I − ARc1j)(Πv + Π²)−1)jj, and hji = ((I −
ARc1j)(Πv + Π²)−1)ji. To see this, notice that given the above deﬁnitions, (Var[vj|sk,pRj])−1
c2j = (1 (hji/hjj))Π², aRjj = (γ/(1 − ρ2
²)) (τ²j− ρ²(hji/hjj)√τ²jτ²i), and aRji = (γ/(1 −
34ρ2
²))(τ²i(hji/hjj) − ρ²





τ²j/τ²i = −(γρ²/(1 − ρ2
²))(√τ²jτ²i(hji/hjj) − ρ²τ²j). Finally, adding
γτ²j, and simplifying I get (A2).
There are now two cases to consider: the case in which ρ² = 0, that gives aRjj = γτ²j and a
cubic equation in aRjj, and the case in which ρ² 6= 0. Start by considering the second (the former is
just a simpliﬁcation of the latter). Substituting the ﬁrst equation in (A2) into the second one, gives
the following cubic equation in aRji
(aRji)3(1 − ρ2
²)(1 − ρ2
v)φ1 + aRjiφ1φ2 + φ3 = 0, (A3)
where φ1 = τ²jτ²i(1−ρ2
v) +τvjτ²i+ τviτ²j+τvjτvi(1−ρ2
²)−2ρ²ρv








τ²i) +τ²j(τvi + τ²i(1 − ρ2
v))) − 2ρvρ²
√τviτ²iτ²jτvj}. The discriminant associated to this equation
is ∆ = 4(φ2/(1 − ρ2
²)(1 − ρ2
v))3 + 27(φ3/(1 − ρ2
²)(1 − ρ2
v)φ1)2, which can be easily proved to be
positive. Hence, there exists a unique real aRji that satisﬁes (A3), and the result follows. Q.E.D.










It is easy to check that (1) is positive. Therefore for a solution to exist, it must be the case that
aRji has a sign opposite to φ3. Since φ3 > 0 ⇔ τ²jCov[²j,²i] > τvjCov[vj,vi], the result follows.




τ²i/τ²j(γτ²j − aRjj). If ρ² > (<)0, aRji > (<)0 always, a contradiction. Next,








τ²j/τ²i)) is always positive.
Finally, parts 3 and 4 follow by manipulating (A2). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 7. For part 1, I will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that for ρv = 0,










The last equation is null if and only if ρ² = 0, hence |aji| 6= |aRji|. Next, suppose |aji| < |aRji| and





2) into (A3) its sign should thus be positive. However, as shown by (A4),
when ρ² > 0, this equation is always negative. A similar argument can be given in the case ρ² < 0.
Thus, |aRji| > |aRji|. Finally, let us show that ajj > aRjj. Consider again ρ² > 0. I have just
shown that in this case either aRji > −γρ²
√τ²jτ²i/(1 − ρ²
2) or −aRji < γρ²
√τ²jτ²i/(1 − ρ²
2).
Multiply both sides of the last inequality by ρ²
q
τ²j/τ²i and add γτ²j. Rearranging this gives
aRjj ≡ γτ²j − ρ²aRji
q
τ²j/τ²i < γτ²j/(1 − ρ²
2). A similar argument can be given for ρ² < 0.
Hence, ajj > aRjj and the result follows. For part 2, if ρ² = 0 then aji = 0, while |aRji| > 0,
hence |aRji| > |aji|, whereas aRjj = ajj = γτ²j. For part 3, if ρ² = ρv = 0, trading intensities
coincide across the two systems. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 8. Suppose ρ² = ρu = 0, and set a1 = A11 = A22, a2 = A12 = A21, aR1 =






















v)). Implicitly differentiating (A3) with respect to ρv, one can see that IpR is convex in ρv and
has a local minimum in ρv = 0. The same result can be obtained for Ip. Perform a second order
expansion of IpR and Ip around ρv = 0 to get IpR(ρv) = IpR(0)+(ρ2
v/2)(∂2IpR/∂ρ2
v)|ρv=0+R1(0)
and Ip = Ip(0) + (ρ2
v/2)(∂2Ip/∂ρ2




R1τu)2+3τv(τ +2τ²+τv)))/(τ3(τ +τ²)2), (∂2Ip/∂ρ2
v)|ρv=0 = (2a2
1τuτv)/τ3 and τ = τv+a2
1τu,





1τu + 5τv)), which is always positive. The result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 9. Using the same notation of the previous proof, suppose ρ² = ρu = 0.
Perform a second order Taylor expansion of λR(ρv) = (τu(a2
R1 + a2
R2 + 2ρvaR1aR2) + τv)−1




v)|ρv=0 = −(τ2(τ + τ²)2)−1 (2γτ²τuτv (a4
1τ2
u + a2
1τu(τ² + τv) − τv(τ² + τv)). In
the same way, for the unrestricted system λ(ρv) = λ(0) + (ρ2
v/2)(∂2λ/∂ρ2








v(τ² + τv) +a2
1τu(τ² + τv)2)) > 0, the result follows. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
First of all, I state a well known result on multivariate normal random variables (see e.g. Danthine
and Moresi, 1992).
Lemma B1 Let w be a vector of n random variables. Assume w ∼ N(µ,Σ), with Σ non singular.
Deﬁne Q(w) = D + b0w + w0Fw, where D ∈ <, b ∈ <n, and F is a symmetric (n × n) matrix.
37Then if 2F + Σ−1 is positive deﬁnite
E[exp(Q(w))] = |Σ|−1/2|2F + Σ−1|−1/2×
exp
½
D + b0µ + µ0Fµ +
1
2
(b − Fµ)0(2F + Σ−1)−1(b − Fµ)
¾
.
Determination of the informed ex-ante expected utility in the restricted system.
Notice that a trader k’s strategy in both assets, can be expressed as XRk(sk,pR) = AR(sk −






















Next, standard normal computations give




























































v (I − ΛRAR)0 + ΛRΠ−1
u Λ0




















and E[−exp{−γ−1πRk}] = E[E[−exp{−γ−1πRk}|v,pR]]. As Ψ can be checked to be non sin-
gular, applying lemma B1 with ((v − pR)0,(¯ v − pR)0)0 = w, one ﬁnds E[−exp{−γ−1πRk}]
= −|Ψ|−1/2|(2/γ)Ω + Ψ−1|−1/2.
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,
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n
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c
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r
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,
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t
e
d
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s
a
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u
n
c
t
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f
ρ
v
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=
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²
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d
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=
.
1
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p
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n
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(
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)
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)
)
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h
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n
γ
=
τ
v
=
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²
=
τ
u
=
1
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p
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n
e
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)
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d
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d
)
)
,
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r
ρ
²
=
ρ
u
=
0
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